In "Weak Inferential Internalism" I defended the frequently voiced Internalism," Rhoda has responded to my dilemma argument. He argues that it is mistaken to assume that WII must be incompatible with externalism, and that contrary to my claims, WII is distinguishable from externalism in several ways. In this reply, I explain why none of Rhoda's replies suggest that there is a defensible internalist account of inferential justification.
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Weak Inferential Internalism is Indistinguishable from
Externalism -A Reply to Rhoda
David Alexander
In "Weak Inferential Internalism" I defended the frequently voiced criticism that any internalist account of inferential justification generates a vicious regress. I considered a new form of internalism, "Weak Inferential Internalism" (WII) that has been expressly defended by Hookway (2000b) , Rhoda (2008) , and more tentatively advanced by Fumerton (2004a Fumerton ( , 2006 and Leite (2008) . Proponents of WII contend that their position does not generate a regress. In my paper, I identified the central principles that characterize the weak internalist position, and showed how they enable the weak internalist to avoid a regress. However, I argued that unless WII makes an arbitrary distinction between individuals who believe for the very same reason, the position is indistinguishable from externalism. My central thesis can be formulated as follows:
AT. The only defensible form of WII is indistinguishable from externalism.
If my defense of AT succeeds, then it provides support for the claim that there is no internalist account of inferential justification that does not generate a vicious regress. For WII does not prove to be a form of internalism at all.
In his response to my paper, Rhoda suggests modifications to some of the principles and taxonomies upon which I rely. More importantly, he 3 offers a sustained critique of my argument by defending the claim that WII is compatible with externalism. In this reply, my focus will be on the latter. Unfortunately, Rhoda is mistaken about the basic structure of the argument. Perhaps my first presentation was not sufficiently clear. In hopes of clarifying matters, I will offer another way of presenting my argument. Doing so will not only show why Rhoda's criticisms fail, but will also further support my thesis that WII does not provide a defensible internalist account of inferential justification. This paper has three sections. In the first I provide a simplified version of my argument, and show that Rhoda's defense of the claim that WII is compatible with externalism fails to engage that argument. In the second section, I reply to Rhoda's proposal that WII can be distinguished from a position he calls "strong externalism." In the third section, I
address the underlying question of what the debate between internalists and externalists ultimately boils down to.
I. RHODA'S RESPONSE TO THE DILEMMA ARGUMENT
Since I allege that Rhoda is mistaken about the structure of my argument, it will be useful to consider a simplified version. My argument takes the form of a dilemma, centered on the question of whether the weak internalist allows for the possibility of what I call "type II justification." A belief has type II justification only if it satisfies two conditions. First, it results from a process of reasoning or inference.
Second, it is unreflective -the belief does not depend upon one's taking one's premises to support one's conclusion. Sometimes one engages in a reflective inference -one infers P from E because it seems to one that E supports P. For example, when a logician carefully deduces a theorem from a set of axioms, he believes the theorem because he believes the axioms support the theorem. There are few who would deny that a belief resulting from a reflective inference can be justified. In contrast, it is 4 controversial whether one can be justified in believing a claim on the basis of an unreflective inference. For example, when Fumerton first introduced the term "inferential internalism," it was clear that he intended it to refer the position that all inferential justification is reflective. Rhoda's primary response to my dilemma argument consists of a defense of the claim that WII is compatible with externalism. For example, he says that "the claim that WII is inherently opposed to externalism is mistaken," (5), and that "the idea that WII is inherently opposed to externalism does not withstand scrutiny," (6). Additionally, after his initial clarifications, the bulk of Rhoda's response is dedicated to arguing that WII is compatible with externalism (5-9). Since this claim plays such a pivotal role in his response, it is worth singling out as "Rhoda's Thesis": Since RT both follows from my conclusion and provides no reason to deny my premises, it provides no reason for thinking that my argument is not sound. For these reasons, Rhoda's response fails to engage my argument.
I suspect that this mistake is due to the fact that Rhoda takes me to instead be offering the following argument:
1. WII is not compatible with externalism.
2. WII is not compatible with externalism only if it rejects the possibility of type II justification.
3. A form of WII that rejects the possibility of type II justification is mistaken.
---------4. So, WII is mistaken. This is a charitable reading of Rhoda's response, since it explains why he focuses on defending RT. For if RT is correct, then the first premise of this argument is false. Unfortunately, this is not a charitable presentation of my argument. As we have seen, my argument takes the form of a dilemma. I neither assume, nor argue for the claim that WII is incompatible with externalism. I argue that either WII is indistinguishable from externalism or it is mistaken. Either way, WII does not provide a correct account of inferential justification that is distinguishable from externalism. An additional reason that this is not a charitable reading of my argument is that, as we have seen, AT entails RT. Given this, why 6 would I appeal to the denial of RT in defense of AT? Perhaps this is not the interpretation of my argument that Rhoda intended. But this is not terribly important. For the important point is that given that AT entails RT, Rhoda's defense of the latter gives us no reason to reject my argument.
II. RHODA'S PROPOSAL FOR DISTINGUISHING WII FROM EXTERNALISM
Rhoda offers one suggestion as to how WII can be distinguished from externalism. If successful, this would indicate that premise 3 of my dilemma argument is false. His suggestion is the following: If, however, by "externalism" is meant strong externalism-the position that all justification is unreflective-then, clearly, WII is opposed to that. In contrast with both strong internalism and strong externalism, WII is a kind of moderate externalism, one which concedes to internalism that some justification is reflective. Likewise, it is a kind of moderate internalism, one which concedes to externalism that some justification is unreflective. (5) According to Rhoda, WII is to be distinguished from externalism in its embrace of a thesis I discussed in my original paper:
RIJ. Some inferential justification is reflective.
This would be an interesting argument if there were externalists who have denied RIJ. It is noteworthy that Rhoda does not offer any examples. To my knowledge, there are none, and for good reason. In my paper I argued that not only can the externalist accept RIJ, he ought to: the externalist will also accept RIJ. Recall the case of the logician who believed a theorem on the basis of a set of axioms in virtue of his taking those axioms to support that theorem. The externalist shares the weak internalist's reason for accepting RIJ. Namely, given examples like that of the logician, in the absence of reason to think 7 otherwise we should hold that we do sometimes acquire reflective justification. The denial of RIJ is a highly skeptical position, one that we would need very strong reasons for adopting. (21) It is important to emphasize just how odd it would be for an externalist to deny RIJ. The example of the logician is supposed to illustrate this.
The logician is someone who believes P on the basis of E in virtue of the fact that he justifiably believes that E supports P. This is what I mean by reflective inferential justification. We do not always reason in this careful manner, and we do not always have such reflective justification. But it is clear that we sometimes do. Why would anyone -externalist or otherwise -deny this? Admittedly, an externalist might also be a skeptic -although externalists are generally a non-skeptical bunch. But that does not mean that he subscribes to a distinctive brand of externalism. Rather, it just means that he subscribes to two independent theses: externalism and skepticism.
In "Weak Inferential Internalism," I did not stop at arguing that the weak internalist and the externalist would both accept RIJ. I also showed that every thesis to which the weak internalist is committed would be accepted by an externalist. For example, I also showed that both would accept RDEP, the thesis that reflective justification ultimately depends upon unreflective justification. Rhoda does not discuss these arguments.
Instead, he invents a form of externalism, "strong externalism," which no externalist has endorsed and which any reasonable externalist should reject, in order to claim that WII can be distinguished from at least one form of externalism. Very well. I concede that WII can be distinguished from such a "form" of externalism. Indeed, I concede that it can be distinguished from innumerable "forms" of externalism that have never been defended, and for good reason. Such as:
Flying Spaghetti Monster Externalism. There is non-reflective inferential justification, and the flying spaghetti monster exists.
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If by "externalism" we mean flying spaghetti monster externalism then WII is distinct from externalism. And if we follow Rhoda's usage and use "externalism" to refer to strong externalism then again, WII is distinct from externalism. Either way, WII is different from forms of externalism that have no proponents. In my paper, I was discussing the forms of externalism that have actually been proposed by externalists such as Goldman, Sosa, Greco, and Bergmann. I claim that WII is not distinguishable from those positions. The fact that WII is distinguishable from indefensible forms of externalism such as strong externalism and flying spaghetti monster externalism provides us with no reason to think that it is distinguishable from the defensible forms of externalism that have actually been advocated.
III. WHAT IS THE DEBATE BETWEEN INTERNALISM AND EXTERNALISM ALL ABOUT?
Clearly, one point of contention concerns how we should understand the debate between internalism and externalism. I have suggested that it primarily concerns the possibility of unreflective justification. If I am right about this, there should be some explanation for why the battle lines are so drawn. I have already suggested one. There is no dispute that if a belief satisfies the conditions of reflective justification, then there is a clear sense in which it has an epistemically valuable property that warrants its being described as justified. However, many epistemologists are far less confident that one can have a justified belief merely by satisfying the conditions of unreflective justification. And I think that even those of us who endorse externalism will grant that at the very least this is a serious philosophical question. Consider again one of the examples used to motivate internalism that Leite has provided, discussed in my original paper: 9 Suppose that someone claims that his lawn has moles. Being ignorant of gardening and curious by nature, I ask why he believes this. He says, "Because it is riddled with holes, hillocks, and collapsed tunnels." I ask whether these things are good reasons for thinking that one's lawn has moles. He replies, "Oh, I haven't the faintest idea.
No views on that at all." (Leite 2008: 423) In contrast to the logician who engages in a reflective inference, it is far less obvious that the gardener, whose belief is not based on a reflective inference, has a justified belief. Indeed, internalists like Fumerton have used these kinds of cases in order to argue that all inferential justification is reflective -that there is no unreflective inferential justification. For they think it is intuitively clear that the gardener is not justified in believing that his lawn has moles, and that the reason for this is that he is not justified in believing that his evidence makes probable his conclusion. This way of thinking is not anomalous, at least in philosophy.
The idea that all justification must be reflective is not uncommon in the history of the discipline, and continues to attract many who first consider these issues. There is a reason why courses in epistemology often begin with Descartes' Meditations. Of course, we externalists hold that this way thinking must be resisted. But that does not mean that we do not recognize that many find it irresistible. Nor does it mean that we do not think that the question of whether unreflective justification is possible is philosophically important. Indeed, externalists hold that this is terribly important, since we believe that the denial of such justification leads to skepticism. For these reasons, if we understand the internalismexternalism debate as centering on the possibility of unreflective justification -as I claim most of us do -then it is understandable why there is such a debate. And if this is correct, then the defensible form of WII that accepts type II justification is not distinguishable from externalism, since it allows for the possibility of unreflective justification.
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In my original paper, I also appealed to Leite's gardener case to provide additional support for the claim that if WII is compatible with type II justification, then it is indistinguishable from externalism. In his reply, Rhoda suggests that WII and externalism can be distinguished by how they would respond to this case. To assess his suggestion, let us first review my original argument. I claimed that both externalism and the defensible form of WII that accepts type II justification have the consequence that the gardener could be justified in believing that his lawn has moles. Granted, the gardener lacks reflective justification. But if you acknowledge that unreflective justification is possible, then from the fact that he lacks reflective justification it does not follow that the gardener's belief is unjustified. On the other hand, if you share Leite and Fumerton's intuition that the gardener is not justified in believing his lawn has moles because he is not justified in believing that his evidence makes probable his conclusion, then you should reject both externalism as well as the form of WII that accepts type II justification. In other words, the traditional internalist parade cases speak against not only externalism, but also the form of WII that accepts type II justification. If like externalism, WII cannot accommodate the traditional internalist parade cases, why should we consider it a form of internalism at all?
In response, Rhoda claims that a proponent of WII can accommodate Leite's case by suggesting that unreflective justification can be defeated by subsequent reflection (7-8). According to Rhoda, the gardener does acquire justification by way of an unreflective inference, but it is undermined when he is in a position to realize that he is not justified in believing that the presence of holes and hillocks makes probable the presence of moles. But that only distinguishes WII from externalism if the externalist cannot say the very same thing. And why can't they? All externalists acknowledge that there is a "no-defeater" condition on justified belief. For example, according to Goldman's process reliabilism, a 11 belief that results from a reliable process may be unjustified insofar as one is justified in believing that the process is in fact unreliable (Goldman 1979: 18) . In general, we can think of the externalist view of ultima facie justification as follows. An externalist will propose that a belief in P is prima facie justified if it satisfies some externalist condition C. However, an externalist will accept a no-defeater condition on ultima facie justification of the following form: if one is justified in not believing that C is satisfied, then the belief is not ultima facie justified. Applied to inferential justification, an externalist will hold that a belief in P that is based on E is not ultima facie justified if one is justified in not believing that E makes probable P.
ii Given their acceptance of such a no-defeater condition on ultima facie justification, externalists will accommodate
Leite's gardener in the same way as weak internalists. 
ENDNOTES
i On Fumerton's use, an inferential internalist is someone who accepts the Principle of Inferential Justification (PIJ): "To be justified in believing one proposition P on the basis of another proposition E, one must be (1) justified in believing E and (2) justified in believing that E makes probable P," (1995, 36) . Why think that Fumerton originally intended PIJ to apply to all inferential justification, rather than restricting it to a particular kind of inferential justification, as do weak internalists? He certainly never explicitly identified any such restriction. But perhaps the simplest reason for this interpretation is the following. PIJ seems to have serious skeptical consequences if and only if it is unrestricted. And Fumerton recognized that his version of internalism seemed to have such skeptical consequences (1995, chapter 7). So clearly he originally intended PIJ to be unrestricted. In "Weak Inferential Internalism" I explain that in recent works, Fumerton has toyed with the possibility of retreating to a weak internalist position, which restricts PIJ to only certain kinds of justification. See the end of section I of that paper.
ii I argue for this at greater length in "Inferential Internalism and Reflective
Defeat." For a similar externalist use of no-defeater conditions to respond to internalist arguments, see Bergmann (2005) .
iii For examples of internalists who reject externalism on the grounds that it allows for beliefs to be justified by way of epistemically circular reasoning, see Fumerton (1995, 177), and Vogel (2000) .
